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THE DARK FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
THE
COSMOPOLITAN
CONSTITUTION.
By
Alexander Somek.' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Pp. xii + 291. $98.50 (cloth).
Dennis Patterson 2
Behind every silver lining there is a cloud.- Glenn Gould

INTRODUCTION
Alexander Somek has written two brilliant books about E. U.
3
law. In Individualism, he demonstrated how the E.U. stifles
Europeans through intrusive regulation. The book is a sustained
attack on the authority of bureaucrats to intervene in the lives of
citizens. Through a trenchant analysis of E.U. smoking
regulations, Somek demonstrates the stultifying effects of
insufferable regulation by the State. The analysis is so compelling,
one almost feels like lighting up a cigarette in one's office just to
push back against the bureaucracy.
To similar effect, in Engineering Equality, 4 Somek focuses his
attention on E.U. anti-discrimination law. He has little positive to
say about it. Not that he is not a good liberal: he supports antidiscrimination. His problem is not with the goal of antidiscrimination but with the fact that progressives are undermining
their own normative aspirations. Through "deconstruction" of the
1. Professor of Law, University of Vienna.
2. Professor of Law and Chair in Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory, European
University Institute, Florence; Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy,
Rutgers University, New Jersey, U.S.A.; Professor of Law and Chair in International
Trade and Legal Philosophy, Swansea University, Wales, U.K. I wish to thank my
colleagues in the E.U.I. Law Department for a stimulating discussion of a draft of this
review. I am especially indebted to Hans Micklitz for extraordinarily helpful comments on
a draft of this essay. Thanks also to Bosko Tripkovic, my superb research assistant.
3. ALEXANDER SOMEK, INDIVIDUALISM: AN ESSAY ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (200X).
4. ALEXANDER SOMEK, ENGINEERING EQUALITY: AN ESSAY ON EUROPEAN
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011 ).
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distinction between "direct" and "indirect" discrimination,
Somek draws the conclusion that E.U. anti-discrirnination law is
"normatively twisted." 5 E.U. anti-discrimination law inverts the
hierarchy between direct and indirect discrimination, thereby
rendering analysis and application of the law a "hotbed of moral
controversy." 6 As a result, the field devolves into pseudonormativity, the goal of which is the creation of" a world inhabited
by better people-and not ... a world where power differentials in
the relation of capital and labour have been readjusted such as to
7
approach evermore closely a sustainable equilibrium."
Now to his latest book, The Cosmopolitan Constitution.
Regarding constitutionalism, Somek's thesis is that modern
constitutionalism has evolved through three distinct epochs. In
the first epoch, best exemplified by the American experience,
constitutionalism is about the constraint of public power.
Grounded in the sovereignty of a people, the constitution is the
expression of their liberty. It is the "constituent power"!' of a free
people that gives the constitution its legitimacy.
After the Second World War, a different form of the modern
constitution emerged. Now constitutional legitimacy flowed not
from the people but from a commitment to the protection of
human rights. The validity of a constitution thus became a
function of the degree to which it passed muster in evaluation by
a system of peer review among nations.
This second iteration of constitutionalism set the stage for the
emergence of the third epoch of constitutionalisn1, what Somek
dubs "The Cosmopolitan Constitution" ("TCC"). There are two
faces to TCC. The first is political. In addition to the protection of
human rights, TCC combats discrimination on the basis of
nationality. Further, TCC develops modalities for 1managing state
interactions with authorities outside the state. Secondly, and more
darkly, TCC cedes political authority to various transnational
administrative entities. 9 What has developed, Somek contends, is
a new form of constitutional authority: authority for an
"administered world" (p. 242).

5. /d. at 16.
6. /d. at 17.
7. /d. at 15. Just as in Individualism, Somck disparages moralists-especially
academics and hurcaucrats-who want to make people "hcttcr." It is one of the most
refreshing aspects of his style.
X. For an excellent discussion of the history of this notion, sec Martin Loughlin, The
Concept of Constituent Power, 13 ELJR. J. POL. THEORY 21X (2014).
9. These include ICANN, ISO, the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank.

2015]

BOOK REVIEWS

669

The story of an evolving constitutional order is the
political/legal aspect of Somek's narrative but it is not the most
important part of his argument. While the ostensible subject of
TCC is constitutionalism, Somek's real target IS global
10
Somek believes the global polity is being
capitalism.
systematically subjugated to the will of a global financial elite.
From the rise of transnational governance to the withering effects
of the Troika, democratic participation is inexorably being
crushed by the interests of global capital. Today, "peoples are
dominated by core institutions of modern capitalism" (p. 238).
Finance (i.e., the interests of global capital) has displaced "the
people." The only way out, Somek avers, is "political action" (p.
11
283).
There is much one might focus on in a review of this rich and
engaging book. Everything from the details of each constitutional
epoch, the rise of transnational regulation, the intricacies of E.U.
law, to the general topic of global constitutionalism deserve
attention. Somek's writing is provocative, stylistically engaging,
and well-informed. After providing an overview of the argument
of the book, I will concentrate on Somek's most wide-ranging
claim, mentioned above: viz., the current epoch of modern
constitutionalism is firmly in the grip of global capitalism.
NATION-STATE AND CONSTITUTION
When one hears "The Cosmopolitan Constitution," the
temptation might be to think the phrase is similar to, if not
synonymous with, "Global Constitutionalism." Nothing could be
further from the truth. Global Constitutionalism- the idea of one
12
law for the globe-is a seminar room fantasy. The nation-state,
which has been the centerpiece of the global order of states since
10. Somek has posted a You Tube video in which he presents the main themes or the
book. See University of Iowa Law Library, Somek on "The Cosmopolitan Constitution",
YouTURE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47NLz2K4zcX. The cover
or the book features a painting by the Austro-Hungarian painter Adolf Hir6my-Hirschl,
entitled "Souls on the Banks of the Acheron." (The painting hangs in the Belvedere
Museum just outside the center of Vienna.) As Somek explains in the video, the painting
shows "Hermes, the god or commerce [global capitalism I, leading the deceased [political[
souls into the underworld." He ends the video by asking the question whether '"our
constitutional experience' has come to an end." If it has, he suggests, the culprit is "global
international capitalism."
11. Here Somek echoes themes similar to Hardt and Negri. See MICHAEL HARDT &
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000). Somek is silent on what forms of political action he has
in mind.
12. In The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Somek relentlessly skewers contemporary
defenders of a global constitutional order.
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the Peace of Westphalia, remains the focus of any effort to
understand world order 13 and, more importantly, the evolution of
constitutionalism at the global level. The nation-state is central to
Samek's brief for TCC.
As mentioned, Modern Constitutionalism has gone through
three iterations. The first iteration of constitutionalism -Somek
calls it "Constitutionalism 1.0" -is, as James Madison put it, "a
14
charter[] of power[s] granted by liberty." Liberty and power are
of the essence of Constitutionalism 1.0. From the American
perspective, which serves as the exemplar, sovereignty lies with
the people. The constitution establishes limited, separated powers
for government. In addition, judicial review subjects the executive
and legislative branches of government to review of their
respective exercises of power. When the executive or Congress
chooses an end for the exercise of its power, "the relationship
between the means chosen and the end pursued" (p. 7) receives
judicial scrutiny.
. ~onstitutionalism 1.0 is .no~ obs.olete, althou9,h the f?c~s
shifts In the move from Constltutlonahsm 1.0 to 2.0. - The shift IS
16
in the focus from power to rights. Somek cites Germany's postWorld War II constitutional experience as the exemplar of the
evolution to Constitutionalism 2.0. In the 2.0 world, a constitution
springs not from a sovereign people but frorn "an act of
reasonable recognition concerning the suprerne value and
authority of human dignity and human rights" (p. 9).
Constitutionalism 1.0 was about voluntary realization of the
values of a people. 2.0 abandons voluntarism and embraces "the
universal values of freedom, equality, and solidarity" (p. 9). The
shift is from liberty to dignity.
Somek provides a wealth of detail in his incisive descriptions
of each constitutional epoch. It is in these details that the reader
sees a foreshadowing of the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0.
Constitutionalism 1.0 was a project of emancipation, best
represented by the French Revolution and the American
colonialists' revolt against Britain. The raison d'etre of this form
of constitutional ism is overcoming the externalities of status and
privilege.
13. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER (2014).
14. James Madison, Charters, NATIONAL GAZETrE (Jan. 19, 1792).
15. As Somek explains, each iteration of constitutionalism is recallihrated as we move
from one epoch to another (p. 9).
16. See Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism 6---9 (UCL School of Puhlic
Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 26, 2007).
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Somek characterizes Constitutionalism 1.0 as "bourgeois" (p.
11 ). The downside of Constitutionalism 1.0 is that it locates its
subjects "within a market society largely immune from state
17
interference" (p. 11 ). Somek does not like this setup. In one of
several gifted, bespoke examples that appear throughout the
book, he says this about life in a market society:
Decentralized human cooperation in markets, however, works
by virtue of unintended man-made necessity. If all surrounding
barbershops offer complementary coffee, my shop has to offer
it too. This necessity is "external" in the sense that the
opportunities to which it gives rise do not reflect what one
wants by virtue of who or what one takes oneself to be. There
is no way of living off exploring the contraction of God at the
moment of creation if all that people want is lean food and
inexpensive mobile phone plans. Likewise, if others work for
less, one has the choice of working for less oneself. If
competitors innovate, one has the choice to innovate first. A
competitive life is spent engaging in pre-emptive strikes. If one
does not choose what one must choose, one will go under. The
choice is the choice of necessity, objectively and subjectively
considered. It is the choice of and by necessity (p. 11 ).

Freedom in this form of social order is "formal"; so much so that
"it is even indifferent to its own choosing" (p. 11 ).
Constitutionalism 2.0 takes a different approach to human
freedom. Here negative liberty is still endorsed but it does so
"through the pooling of risks" (p. 11 ). The aspiration of a society
of dignity is freedom from economic necessity. Where peoples'
choices "are driven by their needs and their fear of losing their
livelihood" (p. 12), they are not really "free." Constitutionalism
2.0 is all about rising above the buffeting effects "of our nature"
(p. 13) as we try to free ourselves from the "potentially enslaving
effects of bourgeois emancipation" (p. 13). It's all quite bleak.
American constitutional practice is fixated on interpretation
of the written text of its constitution. This practice is the key
element of the judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation. By contrast, Constitutionalism 2.0 is grounded in the
recognition of human rights. In this regard, the reflexive
constitutional engagements revolve around proportionality. The
questions are "whether government action has been too intrusive
17. Throughout the hook, Somek makes clear his disdain hoth for capitalism and
markets. He has no affection for ideas like "creative destruction" and there is no place for
Adam Smith in his pantheon.

672

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:667

vis-a-vis fundamental rights or not sufficiently protective of them"
(p. 17).
1
Now Constitutionalism 3.0 starts to emerge. x 2.0 is based on
recognition of human rights. But this presupposition occurs within
the frame of a state with sovereign peoples. Curiously, human
rights-which are supposed to be "superior" to sovereign
authority- require that very same sovereign for their articulation
and realization. The import of this relationship cannot be
overstated. Samek writes:
This relationship of simultaneous superiority and dependence
is of enormous import. First, it means that any institution
wielding public authority needs to he as good as any other in
the face of human rights. Second, whether the institution meets
the relevant standard can only hy ascertained by heeding what
peer institutions are doing. Human rights depend for their
articulation and realization on public authority even though
they also transcend any instantiation of it. The transcendence
of particularity can he real only in horizontal self-relativization.
There is no other way. Sovereignty serves human rights
through its own abdication. Authority says: "I am one among
others. In order to find out whether I live up to my standards,
I will look around and sec what my peers arc doing" (p. 17).

This is the European model of constitutionalism. Through
the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European
Court of Human Rights, transnational standards of rights
protection are established outside the sovereign state with force
and effect within the states' borders. This raises the obvious
question of conflict between national and transnational standards,
thereby engendering the challenge of pluralism which is dealt with
by the doctrine of "margin of appreciation." 19 The doctrine,
Samek maintains,
is based on the idea that national authorities are better
positioned to strike the balance between individual rights and
the common good since they arc in "direct and continuous
contact with the vital forces of their countries." That the vital
forces could be evil forces docs not enter the picture as long as
20
the societies continue to be democratic (p. 19).

I X. As discussed hclow, the dynamics arc largely a matter of economic integration.
1Y. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 54Y3/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737,
91914X-4Y (1Y7ft ), available at http://hudoc.echr.coc.int/sitcs/eng/pages/scarch.aspx'!i=OO I574YY.
20. Citing 1/andyside, I Eur H.R. Rep. 914X.
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Pluralism -competition among legal orders for control- is a
hallmark of European constitutionalism. 21 The legal theoretical
issue is one of legitimate authority. In a clash between legal
orders, say the Court of Justice of the European Union and a
national constitutional court, the question is who wins? The
practice has been for national courts to enforce extra-national
norms "so long as" the extra-national norm meets the minimal
requirement of the national norm. 22
The intercourse between legal orders raises the question of
23
authority. Solange jurisprudence is accommodative and untidy.
Somek disparages it as "the law of the jungle" (p. 21 ). He makes
his point this way:
In practice this means that in the course of pluralist interaction,
all participants are able to exercise any power so long as they
can effectively get away with it. While this smacks of the law of
the jungle, it is obvious that the overall interaction between and
among national or international or supranational sites is
eventually embedded into political constraints. Owing to their
existence, each participant realizes it would be imprudent or
unwise to offend others. They realize that they had better
respect what is important to others and grasp opportunities to
avoid conflict by leaving matters undecided. Constitutionalism
3.0 is, therefore, witness to the return of political
constitutionalism. Effective constraints emerge not from law
but from more or less subtle equilibria of power. In contrast to
the legally grounded political constitutionalism envisaged by
the system of checks and balances, this political
constitutionalism is rather crude. The overall constitution of

21. For discussion, sec KLEMEN JAKLIC, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE E. lJ.
(2013).
22. Somck elahoratcs:
Pluralism in the European Union has given rise to forms of (mutual) cmhcdding.
One legal order pledges to yield to the norms and jurisdiction of another ·'so long
as" its level of fundamental rights protection is sufficiently "equivalent'' to that
of the yielding legal order. This is now cstahlishcd doctrine not only for CIerman
constitutional law vis-a-vis the European Court of .I usticc hut also for the
European Human Rights law vis-a-vis the same court, and, most famously, for
European Union law vis-a-vis the UN Security Council. The national legal orders
and the European Convention System yields to E.U. law, the E.U. yields to the
United Nations and, not least, the Convention system yields to the participating
states "so long as" the requisite others stay within a margin of appreciation,
however it may he actually defined. The system to which room is conceded, need
not he identical, however, a sufficient similarity must he manifest in the long run
(p. 196, citations omitted).
23. "Solange" names important decisions of the German Constitutional Court
regarding constitutional limits to the primacy of E.U. law. For discussion, sec PRINCIPLES
OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411-412 (Armin von Bogdandy & .I urgcn Bast cds.,
2009).
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the multilevel system ceases to be law altogether. It is a factum,
not a norm (p. 21, citations omitted).

Somek has little positive to say about the present era's
treatment of transnational legal phenomena. Having decided that
Constitutionalism 3.0 is really "a form of political [as opposed to
legal] constitutionalism" (p. 22), Somek bemoans the "erosion" of
Constitutionalism 1.0. The erosion reaches from human rights to
transnational law. He writes:
That constitutionalism 3.0 Is a form of political
constitutionalism can be observed also against the broader
social context from which it emerges. It is a world in which the
remains of constitutionalism 1.0 are increasingly subject to
erosion. As a result, one arrives at a twofold picture. While the
world of human rights protection is "pluralistic" owing to
various forms of formal or informal peer review, the
organizational part of constitutional law is permanently under
siege by the exigencies of practical problem solving across
national borders and various layers of an emerging multilevel
system.
The pressures of practical problem solving, which are most
salient in combating terrorism or rescuing a common currency,
affect the role of legislature, which took center place in the
world of constitutionalism 1.0. Nowadays, societies exist under
conditions of permanent social acceleration. Not least owing to
the influence of mass media reporting, the public and politics
are under the impression of being persistently seized by this or
that crisis. Under these conditions, expeditious and effective
problem solving becomes imperative. Authority is, therefore,
systematically inclined to migrate toward transnational fora (or
"networks") of executive governance. The new allocation of
power is occasioned by the impression of necessity. The
authority that is constituted de facto ceases to be based on a
charter created by liberty. In its more disturbing instantiation,
constitutionalism 3.0 is the constitutionalism of necessity (p. 22,
citations omitted).

Human rights protection, constitutional law, and even
transnational fora are all evidence of a crisis in power which is
expressed as a failure in authority that responds to the necessities
of the moment. Gone are the days when there was clarity about
constitutional authority (i.e., the era of Constitutionalism 1.0).
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Now the exigencies of the moment have delivered power into the
hands of the executive. 24 Again, Samek:
Once repeated and expeditious problem solving becomes the
categorical imperative of governance, the executive branch is
likely to gain power at the expense of the legislature. Officially,
the central role accorded to the legislature stays in place.
However, in the face of the exigencies of interventions and the
technicality of regulation, the legislature needs to cede ground
to administrative processes. Legislative delegations and
various avenues of oversight arc means to retain the superiority
of the legislature at a symbolic level. But these arc, in fact, mere
symbols. While delegation has long ceased to be convincing as
a doctrine, oversight might not be terribly effective owing to a
lack of capacity on the part of the legislature to monitor and
apprehend even a fraction of what is done by the administrative
branch. The very reasons that make delegation reasonable
explain why oversight is blunt, in particular owing to the
legislature's lack of information and expertise.
The real world of constitutionalism 3.0 is the world of a
perplexingly diffuse administrative state sans sovereignty
juxtaposed with a multilevel system of fundamental rights
protection. Old domestic authorities persist, not least because
the national coercive apparatus is indispensiblc for purposes of
implementation. It is more cost-effective than private
enforcement or security services. Nevertheless, the center of
gravity with regard to risk management and crisis intervention
shifts to transnational governance structures. As the European
sovereign debt crisis has revealed, formal legal constraints arc
bent in order to accommodate necessities. Elections on the
national level matter inasmuch as they add public acclaim to
one or the other fait accompli. If the voters do not deliver
"reasonable" results they are suspected of adhering to
dangerous right-wing ideology (pp. 22-23, citations omitted).

Not only is constitutionalism descending into the depths of
political uncertainty, we are now witnessing the ever-growing
threat of "authoritarian liberalism" (p. 23). We are approaching
the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0.
The protections of Constitutionalism 1.0 erode in the 3.0 era.
This is why Samek disparages 3.0 as the age of "'political
constitutionalism." The cause of this breakdown is the direct
24. This theme is well c.levelopec.l in the work of Saskia Sassen. See SASKIA SASSEN,
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGIITS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES
14X-271 (2006).
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result of. the develoRment of condi.ti~ns of '.'permanent soci~l
acceleration"(p. 22). · Among the victims of 1ncncased speed Is
authority. Increased speed requires faster decisions and more
effective problem solving than government can provide. Thus we
witness the rise of transnational fora of executive governance. The
effect is the production of an "administrative state sans
sovereignty" (p. 23). What's really at the bottom of all of this:
capitalism, of course. More on this below.
As mentioned above, the Cosmopolitan Constitution has two
faces. The political face of TCC begins with the understanding
that, as cosmopolitans, we are at home anywhere in the world.
Bounded democracies are paradoxical because they are as normal
as they are morally defective. For a bounded democracy to be
truly "cosmopolitan," the interests of "foreigners" must be
represented. But how can people who are by definition
"outsiders" be represented in a democracy? The answer, Somek
avers, is "virtual representation." Virtual representation
"requires adherence to human rights, democracy, the rule of law,
and non-discrimination" (p. 245).
The paradox of bounded democracy is "solved" by what
Somek refers to as "the darling dogma of bourgeois
Europeanists" (p. 253). Often cast as a matter of one state
imposing externalities on another, Somek illustrates the doctrine
with an example. If Spain decides to ban the importation of red
wine because it has ill effects on labor productivity, that act will
have a negative effect on the economy of Portugal. Enter the
dogma: "it is undemocratic for bounded democracies to adopt
decisions whose implementation affects citizens of other states
without giving these citizens a voice" (p. 28).
The dogma contains a paradox. If polities cannot regulate
their own space, then democracy is stifled. Regulation is the
legislative expression of democratic choice. But if that choice is
hindered by restraint on the imposition of externalities on
"foreigners," then democracy is stifled. The D arling Dogma
would thwart the work of democracy.
Liberalism puts rights above the political process: rights are
"trumps." The efficacy of the Darling Dogma requires a theory of
(constitutional) rights that protects the claims of ''foreigners."
Alas, the dogma "says nothing about the legitimacy of the
1

25. Citing William E. Scheuermann, Citizenship and Speed, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY
2X7-306 (Hartmut Rosa & William Scheuerman eds., 2009).
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demands of others. It is substantially empty" (p. 29). The answer
is the transnational and the administrative.
The second face of Constitutionalism 3.0-its administrative
face-is its dark side. Because the state is all about (economic)
integration, and because the legislature has ceded its authority to
the executive, the state simply "administers" in terms most
favorable to the markets. It's the state against the markets and the
markets are winning. Political life has been "diluted" by
subservience to markets. It is the age of "Authoritarian
Capitalism." This is the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0.
Samek identifies "administration" as the nefarious force
suborned by Constitutionalism 3.0. It is through administrative
rationality that the polity loses its democratic character. And, of
course, administrative rationality is the handmaiden of global
capitalism. As I said above, Samek argues that capitalism lies at
the root of the demise of democracy. The administrators of
26
modern nation-states have become unwitting objects of the force
of global capital. Hence Samek's characterization of the present
moment as one of "authoritarian liberalism."
PLURALISM
European constitutional law is preoccupied with pluralism in
a way that tends to go unnoticed in the American context. Of
course, this is due in large part to unique features of European
Union law. From a technical point of view, the question is
sometimes articulated from the perspective of legal orders or legal
27
systems: just how many legal orders are there in Europe? The
second nexus for pluralist discussion is that of the transnational.
The growth of transnational phenomena and the rise of
transnational regulators are subjects of intense scholarly interest.
Again, pluralism is a central feature of these discussions.
There are both legal theoretical as well as political issues
implicated in discussions of pluralism. Samek articulates
pluralism as an issue in legal theory before discussing its place in
Constitutionalism 3.0. His thesis is that contemporary
conceptualizations of pluralism set the stage for the demise of law
26.

The rise of administrators as agents of nation-state policies is explored in ANNEA NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
27. One of the hest treatments of the question from the point of view of legal theory
is Julie Dickson, How Many Legal Systems?: Some Puzzles Regarding the Identity
Conditions oj; and Relations Between, Legal Systems in the f.:uropean Union, 2 PROBLEMA
lJ (200H).
MARIE SLAUGHTER,
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and the rise of global capitalism. They do this by (unwittingly)
replacing
"legal
constitutionalism"
with
"political
constitutionalism." As Somek states, "Pluralism ... marks the
point at which constitutional law comes to an end" (p. 197).
The "gist" of pluralism, Somek argues, is to be found in the
distinction between institutional pluralism and system pluralism
(pp. 193-194). When a president and a court each assert their
authority to interpret the constitution, this is an instance of
institutional pluralism. The clash is internal in that each
protagonist lays claim to the interpretive authority within the
same legal order.
When two legal orders claim ownership of a question or
issue, we have an instance of systems pluralism. The clash is much
deeper than that of the institutional context because each legal
2
order is asserting its authority vis-a-vis the other. K A.s Somek puts
it, the "norms belonging to different systems are irrelevant to one
another" (p. 194). He provides an example:
The now classical instance of system pluralism in the European
Union is manifest in the assertion by the European Court of
Justice that the European legal system is autonomous and
hence independent of any external limitations determined by
the constitutional laws of the Member States. This assertion is
matched by Member States constitutional courts' claims that
the authority of the European Union is derivative of the
delegations made pursuant to national constitutions and can
never go, within such constitutions, beyond constitutionally
proscribed limits (p. 194, citations omitted).

Somek treats the problem of clashing legal systems as
fundamentally jurisprudential. He points out that the clash
between competing legal systems "could only be resolved on the
basis of one overarching system" (pp. 194-195). Given this
structure, a third system is needed to manage the conflict and
decide which system controls the question. Somek credits Hans
Kelsen with this insight. Of course, Solange jurisprudence tries to

2X. Somek cites and quotes the classic reference to the problem. It is the work of Neil
MacCormick:
Where there is a plurality of institutional normative order~. each with a
functioning constitution (at least in the sense of a hody of higher-order norms
establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers), it is possihle that
each acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none
asserts or acknowledges constitutional superiority over another. In this case,
'constitutional pluralism' prevails (p. 1YO n.YO, quoting NEIL MACCORMICK,
QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMONWEALTH 104 (1 YYY)).
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massage the situation through a careful dialectic of
29
accommodation. Somek will have none of this.
Somek rejects institutional pluralism on grounds of legal
theory. In addition, institutional pluralism paves the way for
political constitutionalism. Here Somek draws a distinction
between law and politics. The question is "what mediates mutual
yielding and explains its legitimacy?" (p. 197). The answer to the
legitimacy question is "nothing." As a consequence,
"[p ]luralism ... marks the point at which constitutional law comes
to an end" (p. 197). Pluralism is not "law'' but "the law of the
jungle" (p. 198). It is "political" because "it comprises merely
political processes whose patterns may actually reflect power
differentials" (p. 197).
Somek disparages the work of a variety of "apologists of
pluralism" (p. 198), especially that of Mattias Kumm. Regrettably,
Somek's disparagement depends on a distinction for which he
provides absolutely no argument, between the "legal" and the
"political." As he has done in previous work, 30 Somek invokes the
authority of Hans Kelsen in drawing this all-important distinction.
That is fine, as far as it goes, but citing Kelsen is not the same thing
as providing an argument. And this Somek fails to do. Somek
credits Kelsen's insight (described as "valid") that an overarching
system is needed to break the deadlock between competing legal
systems.

2Y. Somck dcscrihcs the matter thus:
Each system lays down the conditions under which it concedes authority to
others. The others lsicllaws arc respected and applied even though they arc of
foreign origin. This way of managing the pluralist situation is epitomized in the
ingenious reply formulated in the so-called Solange I decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court. In this case, the Court had to address the claims made hy
the Court of Justice of the European Union that Ell. law is autonomous and
supreme. The thrust underlying these claims was, of course, that no national law,
not even national constitutional law, could trump EU law. The Federal
Constitutional Court replied calmly that while the autonomy and supremacy of
the EU legal order could not he disputed, the scope within which Ell law can
trump German law is to he determined pursuant to German constitutional law.
Within the space allocated hy the German constitution to EU law it is allowed to
reign supreme (p. 195, citations omitted).
30. In an earlier article on Kclscn, Somck makes the same qucstion-hcgging move;
that is, invoking Kdscn with no explanation of what he (i.e., Somck) means hy "law":
The purveyors of legal pluralism, fragmentation and 'polycontcxturality' offer
valuahlc insights; hut they should make explicit, too, that in speaking ahout a
plurality of legal systems they produce an equivocation in the concept of legal
validity. Legal validity may well he in demise. This should give the advocates of
pluralism reason to acknowledge that what they arc talking ahout is no longer
law. Alexander Somck, Kelsen Lives, 1X EUR. J. INTERN'L LAw 409, 425 (2007)
(internal citations omitted).
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Somek condemns the "so long as" style of reasoning not only
because he deems it "political," but because as such "[t]he people
are lost" (p. 201 ). As he puts it, "Constitutionalism 3.0 admits
bourgeois anarchism to constitutional law" (p. 200). Because
courts are "entrusted with the task of protecting rights" (p. 201 ),
it is paramount that they remain within the bounds of the law.
Here we see the last remnants of Constitutionalism 1.0 snuffed
out:
In the context of constitutionalism 1.0, publicists explained the
authority of the constitution by resorting to the idea of a social
contract. The idea was that the constitution represents a mutual
promise of citizens who thereby become members of a people
or political society. They pledge to each other to respect
constituted authority and to conduct themselves as members in
good standing of their polity. The constitution is a norm that is
shared by them. It lends unity to all relationships that citizens
engage in (p. 200).

Everything Somek says about constitutionalism depends on
the distinction he draws between law and politics. There are two
issues with Somek's reliance on this distinction. First is the
question whether the distinction is precise enough to yield the
consequences Somek desires. His position is based on the view of
law as essentially apolitical, as something that is able to keep
politics in check. 1udith Shklar could have been describing
Somek's views when she wrote in 1964: "Politics is regarded not
only as something apart from law, but as inferior to law. Law aims
at justice, while politics looks only to expediency. The former is
neutral and objective, the latter the uncontrolled child of
31
competing interests and ideologies." But such views-Somek's
included-do not appreciate an important nuance: when law
32
attempts to constrain politics, it arguably becomes politicized.
Treatment of pluralism as a jurisprudential phenomenon-and
not as a wider political and societal condition -leads Somek to
neglect the fact that law is likely to reflect and often amplify
political differences rather than ameliorate the:m. The same
process could be happening in the European Union, and

31.
(llJ64).
32.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 111

As Martin Loughlin puts it, "legalization of politics has led primarily to the
politicization of law." MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 233 (2000).
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jurisprudential clashes between courts could simply be a symptom
of underlying political pluralism.
This brings us to the second question: do we have reason to
prefer legal over political solutions to the fact of pluralism? The
resolution of this issue supervenes on Somek's ability to make a
sharp distinction between law and politics, and his capacity to
show that his idea of law is somehow preferable to politics.
Constitutional pluralists take the opposite approach: they argue
that l~ss crude forms ?f regll:lation and ,political en?agement are
supenor to Somek's hierarchical model. - On such views, not only
is the complete legalization of the constitutional domain in the
European Union impossible, but it is also normatively
problematic under the circumstances of disagreement and
pluralism. There is also an important strand of theoretical
thinking about constitutionalism that rejects its legalized form and
recommends political constitutionalism as an alternative. 34
Perhaps Somek would agree with them that the courts should not
deprive people of their democratic political experience. But then
his plea for a legal-hierarchical form of legitimation on European
level is puzzling: he cannot have it both ways.
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Although transnational governance networks or institutions
lack a public law pedigree, they are part of what Somek identifies
as "a perplexingly diffuse administrative state sans sovereignty
and a multilevel system of fundamental rights protection" (p.
233). For the "legitimacy" of institutions such as ICANN, 35 it is
necessary that they be "rooted in some constitutional order" (p.
229). But, Somek explains, transnational institutions are not
legitimated through law, rather, their measure is "first and
foremost in administrative accomplishment" (p. 229), that is,
"effective management of administrative processes" (p. 229).
Just as with constitutionalism, transnational governance is
dismissed as "anarchical" (p. 230). Somek does not explain what
33. See, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Matcj Avhelj
& Jan Komarek eds., 2012).
34. See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007); ADAM
TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005).
35. ICANN is the non-profit California corporation responsible for the assignment
of domain names on the internet.
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would make transnational processes legitimate other than some
connection to "law." More darkly, transnational institutions and
processes are all part of the bleak edifice of Constitutionalism 3.0,
the defining feature of which seems to be the "collapse" of
Constitutionalism 1.0. In the course of things, "the people" are
lost. They become "a counterfactual social fact" (p. 238).
How have things gotten so bad? The answer is simple:
capitalism. Somek explains:
It has already become somewhat of a truism that nowadays
peoples arc dominated by core institutions of modern
capitalism. The reactions of economic agents, such as financial
markets or rating agencies, arc of utmost importance to the
design of economic and fiscal policies, while, at the same time,
these agents do not bear any public responsibility. Financial
markets have a neolibcral predilection for public austerity.
Consequently, governments cooperating across national
bounds need to ever more tightly contain grassroots resistance
against retrenchment in order to implement from above what
is good for a "healthy economy." Therewith emerges a new
brand of authoritarian liberalism. Similar to its original form, it
stands for economic governance that severs its dependence on
the support of parliamentary democracy. It is subtler today,
however, than it was in the 1930s. Members of the assembly are
no longer simply sent home. They arc expected to bow to the
reasonableness of pacts concluded between governments and
financial institutions. (pp. 238-239).

The bottom line is that in the era of Constitutionalism 3.0,
governments have become hostages to global capital.
Somek advances a fascinating narrative in support of his
assertion of a deep connection between Constitutionalism 3.0 and
global capitalism. Following the German sociologist Wolfgang
36
Streeck, Somek's narrative begins after World War II. He
describes the situation thus:
If Strecck is right, the post-war development of the Western

economics has been witness to a displacement of the original
conflict between capital and labor with a persistent tug-of-war
between countries with high public debt, on the one hand, and
financial markets, on the other. Countries that struggle to
restore private credit to their damaged economies have to
increase their public debt. In order to succeed at that, they
depend on a favorable response from those institJUtions that
36.
REVIEW

See, e.g., Wolfgang Strccck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT
5 (2011 ).
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actually benefit from their largesse. Evidently, the locus of
control shifts from politics to the economy. The consequences
are disheartening. In order to come out with a sustainable
credit score, countries need to implement austerity programs
that signal credibility to credit markets. Countries seem to have
no choice. The affected populations either react with revolt or
realize that there is nothing left for politics to decide and turn
away from democracy. It begins to dawn upon them that the
real constraints on governance are economic. They arc intrinsic
to fostering the public weal (p. 23, citations omitted).

What emerges is what Somek identifies as "authoritarian
liberalism" (p. 23). Nation-states are subjugated to financial
markets. States, and their economies, are governed not as
democracies but run like businesses. Everything is economic: it's
all about "micro-management" (p. 24).
Streeck maintains that, following the Second World War,
capitalism permitted politics to enter in economic planning. By
the 1970s, laissez-faire capitalism was dead, having been replaced
by "some political control of the economic system" (p. 239).
Capital then pulled out of the earlier post-war settlement, owing
to rising inflation. To combat capital flight, states reduced wages
and tolerated high unemployment. The perennial conflict
between capitalism and democracy then moved into the forum of
electoral politics. Governments responded to rising wages and the
threat of economic slump by deregulating the financial sector.
This gave birth to what Crouch calls "Privatised Keynesianism," 37
epitomized, Somek claims, "by the policies of the Clinton years"
(p. 240). With the disappearance of wage increases and
increasingly austere social policy, risky credit filled the void with
"[i]ndividual private debt replac[ing] public debt" (p. 240). Then,
in 2008, the U.S. housing bubble burst, forcing the government to
rescue the banks. As mentioned, ironically, governments find
themselves beholden to the same institutions which benefitted
from their assistance. It gets worse. Somek summarizes the
situation: "International institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund, or supranational bodies, such as the Commission
and the European Central Bank, demand these programs. The
spoils and benefits of the banking system are now financed
through pension cuts and the phasing out of entitlements" (p.
240).

37. See Colin Crouch, Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime,
11 13RITISH J. POL. & INTERN'L REL. 3X2, 3X7-XX (2009).
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Somek describes the "tug of war" between governments and
finance thus:
It is important to realize that the tug-of-war between

governments and haute finance is merely a symptom.
Generally, symptoms are unsuccessful attempts at problem
solving. An inflammation, for example, is a defense
mechanism, and in this respect it is beneficial; but it is also
painful and can give rise to additional ailments. The underlying
problem, of which the domination of states by financial
markets is the symptom, is the conflict between the interests of
capital, on the one hand, and the interest of the great mass of
people who until a few decades ago had been able to usc
democracy in order to assert their interests politically. The preeminence of finance vis-a-vis politics is merely a displaced
manner in which the latter experience their subordination to
the former (p. 240).

This leaves nation-states answerable to two different sorts of
"people." The first are their own citizens and the second are a
group Streeck calls "market people." Market people are a private
polity but they have all the power. They vote with their feet and
their money. "They vote through the buying or selling of
securities, through investment in a local business project or
through accepting well-paid employment" (p. 241). It is the fate
of the polity- "ordinary folks"- to cling to their withering "social
rights, guaranteed on the basis of national constitutional
arrangements" (p. 241 ). The only way to ameliorate this situation
is for "constitutionalism ... to return to a way of thinking from
which it had once emerged" (p. 241 ).
There are two questions to ask about this diagnosis of the
present situation in constitutional law (Constitutionalism 3.0).
The first regards the plausibility of Streeck's analysis, on which
Somek so heavily relies. Second, even if Streeck is correct in his
diagnosis of the post-war realignment of relations between labor
and capital, does this account for the present state of
constitutionalism?
Streeck's thesis begins with the claim that the 2008 financial
crisis was not a "one off" event. Rather, he n1aintains, "the
present crisis can only be fully understood in terms of the ongoing,
inherently conflictual transformation of the sociall formation we
call 'democratic capitalism'." 3x This is not the place to debate the
macroeconomic aspects of Streeck's thesis. I will, however,
3X.

Strccck, supra note 36, at 5.
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observe that both in the hands of Streeck and Somek, the thesis
starts to lose plausibility once one moves beyond the borders of
Continental Europe.
First, consider the Nordic countries. 19 Does the IMF tell
Norway what to do with its oil riches? Is the Swedish welfare state
40
not thriving? And what of unemployment in Denmark and
Finland? None of these economies seems to be under the control
of the IMF, the ECB, or anyone else. Their welfare states are
doing just fine. They do not confirm Streeck's thesis.
Outside of Europe, one finds more than a few
counterexamples to Streeck's thesis. The Canadian bankinR
system felt little of the ill effects of the Lehman meltdown. 1
India's economy is booming, as is China's. The United States
saved the banks and made billions in the process. 42 Australia,
Rus~ia, Mexico, Korea an? J~pan all seem to fall outside the
confines of Streeck's narrative. ·
Does Streeck explain what is going on in the Eurozone? Up
to a point, yes. But, as Ulrich Beck has pointed out, 44 the principal
ideologue in setting austerity policy is Germany. As of the time of
this writing, the new Greek government is withering in its attempt
to throw off the yoke of austerity. It isn't only bond yields that are
putting pressure on the Greeks: it is Berlin. The reasons are
ideological and not fiscal. Merkel and Schauble are not pressing
3lJ. Tht.: t.:vidt.:nct.: is found in acct.:ssible form in an issue of The Hconomist devoted to
the Nordic countries. See The Next Supermodel, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.cconomist.com/ncws/lcadcrs/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-lcft-couldlcarn-nordic-countrics-ncxt-supcrmodcl.
40. For informed discussion, sec SVEN STEINMO, TilE EVOUITION OF MODERN
STATES: SWEDEN, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2010).
41. See David Cho, U.S. Take If It Sells Its Citi Stake To Settle Cost of Bailout: $8
Billion, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/contcnt/articlc/201 0/03/26/ AR20 10032604lJ3X.html.
42. The U.S. government banked 15 billion dollars on its bailout stake in Citicorp.
See Stephen Gandcl, Government Banks $15 Billion on Citigroup Bailout, FORTUNE (Sept.
10, 2013), http://fortunc.com/2013/0l)/l 0/govcrnmcnt-banks-15-billion-on-citigroup-bail
out/.
43. At least two of the states mentioned in this paragraph arc controversial: China
and Russia. The obvious objection is that neither is "democratic." There is an obvious
sense in which this is true. But I think Fukuyama had it right when ht.: said that we have
st.:cn "the end of history" wht.:n it comes to the triumph of dt.:mocracy over fascism and
communism. Going forward, there is no alternative. Sec Frands Fukuyama. The End of
1/istory?, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1l)XlJ. Travel and t.:dut.:ation arc two mdrics for
democracy. In this regard, it is interesting to nott.: the great expansion in the numbt.:r of
students from Russia and t.:spccially China travt.:lling to the U.S. and the U.K. for university
and post-graduate education. See 5pecial Report- Universities: "Excellence v lc'quity," THE
ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.t.:conomist.com/ncws/special-rcport/21646l)X5amt.:rican-modcl-highcr-t.:ducation-spreading-it-good-producing-cxccllcncc.
44. See ULRICH BECK, GERMAN EUROPE (2013).
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their case because they are the puppets of global capital. They are
doing it because they think it is deontologically required. That's
ideology, not finance.
What about the connection between transnational regulators
and global finance? Here the link seems even rnore tenuous.
Somek rails against the Basel Committee, the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the World Health Organization and
the IMF because they are "relatively immune to political
challenge and operate on the basis of their own functional
specifications and institutional culture" (p. 274). For Somek, the
only form of legitimacy for organizations dealing with
transnational or global challenges is democracy. A.s he correctly
states, the claim of such organizations "is based on the generation
and implementation of expertise" (p. 274). But Somek rejects
45
expertise as a ground of authority or legitimacy. He seems to
prefer his authority and legitimacy the old-fashioned way:
through democratic participation in a nation-state. That is why he
never wavers in his belief that the nation-state is central to the
future of constitutionalism.
Somek's argument depends a great deal on the strength of
Streeck's analysis. As I have suggested, Streeck's thesis faces
some strong explanatory headwinds as the Northern part of
continental Europe does not confirm his thesis. Additionally,
there are just too many states in the world today that do not fit
the narrative.
Ironically, if Somek is correct about the state of world affairs,
then there is no way to rehabilitate nation-state democracies to
the extent that they can actually deal with the issues he discusses.
The irony is that he must either give up constitutionalism or the
nation-state (the two things he likes most), and embrace either of
the things he disdains, the wishful thinking of global
constitutionalism
or
the
impotency
of
nation-state
constitutionalism.

45. Somek considers and rejects Joseph Raz's Service Conception of Authority. He
writes:
The application of this 'service conception' of authority presuppo~;es not only that
people would find it easy to distinguish between what they confidently know
themselves and what is better for them to have known hy others, hut also that the
meaning and scope of the conception could he easily ascertained. The roughly 40
densely argued pages that Raz recently wrote elaborating the conception must
make this appear doubtful (p. 2XO, citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
My cnticisms notwithstanding, this is an engaging and
important book. Somek's diagnosis of the current state of
constitutional theorizing is at once compelling and provocative.
What is truly remarkable about this book is the way Somek links
debates about constitutionalism to global forces in a way no one
else does. This is an extraordinary achievement. Even if one
disagrees with the thesis, the arguments must be taken seriously.
No one else in constitutional or legal theory is writing anything
like this. Quite simply, this is a book no one can ignore.

